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Abstract 
As new technologies are developed to handle the 
complexities of the Next Generation Air 
Transportation System (NextGen), it is increasingly 
important to address both current and future safety 
concerns along with the operational, environmental, 
and efficiency issues within the National Airspace 
System (NAS).  In recent years, the Federal Aviation 
Administration’s (FAA) safety offices have been 
researching ways to utilize the many safety databases 
maintained by the FAA, such as those involving flight 
recorders, radar tracks, weather, and many other high-
volume sensors, in order to monitor this unique and 
complex system. Although a number of current 
technologies do monitor the frequency of known 
safety risks in the NAS, very few methods currently 
exist that are capable of analyzing large data 
repositories with the purpose of discovering new and 
previously unmonitored safety risks. While 
monitoring the frequency of known events in the NAS 
enables mitigation of already identified problems, a 
more proactive approach of finding unidentified issues 
still needs to be addressed. This is especially important 
in the proactive identification of new, emergent safety 
issues that may result from the planned introduction of 
advanced NextGen air traffic management 
technologies and procedures. Development of an 
automated tool that continuously evaluates the NAS to 
discover both events exhibiting flight characteristics 
indicative of safety-related concerns as well as 
operational anomalies will heighten the awareness of 
such situations in the aviation community and serve to 
increase the overall safety of the NAS. This paper 
discusses the extension of previous anomaly detection 
work to identify operationally significant flights 
within the highly complex airspace encompassing the 
New York area of operations, focusing on the major 
airports of Newark International (EWR), LaGuardia 
International (LGA), and John F. Kennedy 
International (JFK).  In addition, flight traffic in the 
vicinity of Denver International (DEN) 
airport/airspace is also investigated to evaluate the 
impact on operations due to variances in seasonal 
weather and airport elevation.  From our previous 
research, subject matter experts determined that some 
of the identified anomalies were significant, but could 
not reach conclusive findings without additional 
supportive data. To advance this research further, 
causal examination using domain experts is continued 
along with the integration of air traffic control (ATC) 
voice data to shed much needed insight into resolving 
which flight characteristic(s) may be impacting an 
aircraft's unusual profile. Once a flight characteristic 
is identified, it could be included in a list of potential 
safety precursors. This paper also describes a process 
that has been developed and implemented to 
automatically identify and produce daily reports on 
flights of interest from the previous day.  
Introduction 
The NAS continues to evolve as new NextGen 
technologies and procedures are introduced.  A key 
challenge for aviation stakeholders is to ensure the 
reaping of the potential benefits of operational 
efficiencies gained by the new concepts and 
procedures, while at the same time maintaining the 
superb track record for NAS safety established over 
the past several decades.  As the NAS changes, it is 
likely that the safety-related aspects of the system will 
change as well, and so it is important to actively 
engage in the discovery of new potential safety risks 
on an ongoing basis.  NASA, in partnership with the 
FAA, and industry is continuing to develop new 
technologies and techniques to identify previously 
undiscovered safety events through the intense data 
mining of large heterogeneous aviation data sets that 
are collected on a regular basis.  These techniques have 
the potential to find new safety risks in the system or 
risks that did not exist previously but are a result of the 
implementation of NextGen concepts.  Combined with 
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more traditional monitoring of safety buffer 
exceedances and cataloguing of known safety-related 
incidents, this approach helps to provide a more 
holistic view into the safety of the NAS.   
This paper presents the next step in the 
development of advanced data mining algorithms as 
applied to high fidelity surveillance and trajectory 
data.  It builds upon previous research [1] by adding 
more features to the mathematical models to discover 
previously unknown safety-related events. This 
research expands into operations in the New York 
Metro area and at Denver International Airport to see 
how the discovery algorithms can function in both 
highly congested and dynamic weather impacted 
environments.  As with previous efforts, subject matter 
expertise is incorporated into the research to provide 
specific domain knowledge of operational procedures 
and to understand the safety implications of the 
discovered events.  In addition, the evaluation of 
algorithm results is made clearer by the inclusion of 
(ATC) voice communications from frequencies 
involved at the time of the event occurrence.   
This paper is organized as follows: First we 
present an overview of the Performance Data Analysis 
and Reporting System (PDARS) which delivers 
several capabilities to enhance this research including 
serving as the source of the trajectory information.  
Next we discuss the state of the previous research 
efforts in this area. We then present the primary 
algorithms used for the discovery of safety events and 
the specific data used for the research.  Since the data 
processing and handling is quite involved, we give an 
overview of the end-to-end system for algorithm 
application and introduce a prototype for 
incorporating these techniques on a daily basis.  We 
then present the primary results of the research 
including 11 actual traffic scenarios that were 
identified as operationally significant anomalies along 
with a brief safety analysis for each. Although 5 out of 
the 11 scenarios involve go-arounds, which are 
typically recorded in the control tower’s daily logs and 
captured by daily PDARS reports, the algorithm and 
the subject matter expert’s reviews also provide 
detailed insight into what factors contributed to the 
anomalous event. Finally we discuss the conclusions 
and introduce ideas for future research goals. 
Background 
PDARS Program 
For over a decade, the Performance Data 
Analysis and Reporting System (PDARS) has 
continued to provide FAA organizational managers 
and decision makers with “actionable” information 
regarding the efficiency and safety of the NAS.  
PDARS is a product of collaborative research between 
NASA and the FAA that was recognized for its 
excellence by receiving the NASA Administrator’s 
Turning Goals into Reality (TGIR) award in 2003 and 
achieving full technology transfer from NASA to the 
FAA in 2005[2].  The PDARS program is managed by 
the FAA’s Air Traffic Organization Office of System 
Operations Services and is heavily used operationally 
by over a dozen organizational units within the FAA, 
many on a daily basis. 
PDARS consists of an ever-evolving data 
collection, processing, reporting, and dissemination 
platform able to accept nearly any surveillance or 
positional data and merge that with other geo-
referenced or contextual aviation-related data (e.g. 
weather, terrain, or schedules). The system routinely 
produces analysis products including reports and 
visualizations that provide detailed operational insight 
to decision makers at virtually any level in a complex 
Air Navigation Service Provider (ANSP) organization 
such as the FAA.  The development of PDARS has 
been from the beginning and continues to be driven by 
the needs of the user base: those actively involved in 
direct operation of the NAS and the associated 
challenging areas such as safety, efficiency, and 
environmental concerns [2]. PDARS’ flexible 
reporting structure produces over 1,500 reports daily, 
many of them safety related such as go-arounds, Class 
B airspace excursions, interacting runway operations, 
and turns-to-final.   
Key PDARS capabilities used in this research are 
its routine collection and processing of large 
surveillance-based trajectory information sets, 
categorization of key flight parameters such as runway 
utilization, its ability to compute additional geospatial 
measures on aviation data sets on a large scale, and its 
suitability as a technology transfer platform for new 
technologies.  In particular, the development of a 
prototype daily anomaly report is one important 
outcome of this research.  The data mining algorithms 
presented in this paper make perfect candidates for 
incorporation into one or more PDARS “anomaly” 
reports, which could be produced on a daily basis. 
Current State-Of-The-Art Safety Monitoring 
Many of the existing safety monitoring 
technologies used today in the NAS are based on the 
ability to define the characteristics of high-risk safety 
events and utilize current sensor measurements to 
detect safety risks. Safety tools used by the FAA that 
monitor continuous loss of standard separation such as 
the Operational Error Detection Program (OEDP) [4], 
which look at loss of separation en route, have been in 
place for more than a decade. More recently deployed 
is the Traffic Analysis and Review Program (TARP), 
which monitors Terminal Radar Approach Control 
Facilities (TRACON) operations and provides the 
Comprehensive Electronic Data Analysis and 
Reporting (CEDAR) tool, the way to clearly define 
when a safety incident occurs and to what degree it 
was unsafe. A report filed by the Office of Inspector 
General in February 2013 [5] discusses the 
effectiveness of TARP and CEDAR; however, it notes 
that there is a shortcoming in the tool’s ability to 
completely capture all loss of separation incidents as 
compared to what was reported in the voluntary Air 
Traffic Safety Action Program (ATSAP). The report 
also states that the FAA was unable to fully review all 
cases to determine if a valid loss of separation had 
occurred. These limitations can lead to a significant 
discrepancy between the safety risks that are 
monitored and those that are actually happening in the 
airspace. Since these tools are designed to identify 
specific safety risks, they can be very effective in 
detecting the known safety events being monitored; 
however, they are not looking for events outside of 
their predefined scope. Airline operated Flight 
Operational Quality Assurance (FOQA) programs 
take a similar approach to detecting and tracking 
safety events within an airline’s fleet. By using 
predefined safety events, rule-based exceedance 
checks are used to determine to what degree certain 
aspects of a flight were safe or not and what actions 
can be taken, such as enhanced training or internally 
circulated newsletters, to mitigate these known risks.  
While using the predefinition of safety events 
methodology is very effective in monitoring safety 
incidents and their frequency, this approach does not 
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have the flexibility to detect new or unknown safety 
issues. Working groups such as the Commercial 
Aviation Safety Team (CAST)1  work with industry 
and government agencies to address and reduce newly 
identified risks in the NAS. These risks may be 
identified by pilot safety reports and analysis of the 
flight data and/or accident/incident investigations; 
however, this typically is a manual process. Over the 
last decade, NASA and other institutions such as MIT 
have invested in developing data mining techniques to 
discover safety events in FOQA data 
[3],[6],[7],[8],[9]. Some of these algorithms have been 
evaluated on large domestic FOQA data repositories 
by MITRE through the Aviation Safety Information 
Analysis and Sharing System. Although FOQA data 
contains detailed measurements from a fleet of aircraft 
and can be used to address many safety questions, one 
drawback, besides only being collected from 
participating carriers, is that it is limited to single 
aircraft operations and does not fully capture the 
interaction between multiple flights in the airspace at 
the same time. Recently, these algorithmic concepts 
have been adapted to the radar track data [1] where 
safety events that involve safely spacing and 
sequencing of flights were detected and validated by 
subject matter experts from the Southern California 
TRACON (SCT). The work discussed in this paper 
builds upon the previous SCT radar track anomaly 
detection study, while incorporating new features that 
help to characterize the interaction between multiple 
aircraft. The tool is also validated by data from two 
additional TRACON facilities covering four major 
domestic airports. This paper also discusses how the 
algorithm has evolved from a research tool into an 
integrated prototype daily anomaly reporting 
capability.  
Multiple Kernel Anomaly Detection 
The algorithm selected for this study, Multiple 
Kernel Anomaly Detection (MKAD), uses a one class 
Support Vector Machine [1] architecture, which is 
used extensively for anomaly detection in the field of 
data mining. The method learns a decision boundary 
separating nominal and anomalous data points based 
on a pairwise kernel (similarity) matrix and can 
identify statistically significantly anomalous 
examples.  One of the key components to SVMs is the 
kernel function that defines the similarity between two 
vectors. Choosing a measure that poorly distinguishes 
between these vectors will significantly impede the 
performance of the algorithm.  In our previous SCT 
study [1] we used the cosine similarity as the kernel 
function between two trajectories because it possessed 
a straightforward geometric interpretation between the 
flight trajectories and did not have any hyper-
parameters that needed to be optimized.  For this study 
we replaced the cosine similarity kernel with the radial 
basis function (rbf) (Eq. 1), which has been very 
popular in the machine learning community for many 
years. 
Kernel Function:  𝜅𝑛(?⃗?𝑖, ?⃗?𝑗) = 𝑒𝑥𝑝
−
‖?⃗⃗?𝑖−?⃗⃗⃗?𝑗‖
2𝜎2             (1) 
Though, the cosine similarity kernel could still be used 
for all features, the rbf kernel function was chosen 
because an additional feature (the distance to the 
nearest aircraft vector) had been added to the feature 
space. With this additional feature the geometric 
interpretation of the cosine similarity function that 
pertained to the previous trajectories was no longer 
appropriate. On the other hand, the rbf kernel can be 
abstracted to any multidimensional vector space. Even 
though MKAD has the ability to combine kernels from 
different kernel functions, in practice it has been 
observed that keeping the kernels the same whenever 
possible helps to maintain similar distributions across 
the kernels and helps produce anomaly feature 
contributions with more consistency. In this case the 
rbf kernel was appropriate for all features. One 
additional complexity that the rbf kernel has over the 
cosine similarity kernel is the hyperparameter σ that 
determines the width of the Gaussian distribution over 
the vector space.  If σ is too large then all vectors 
appear similar and if σ is too small then all vectors 
appear dissimilar. The approach that was used to tune 
σ in this study was to compute a 1000 x 1000 kernel 
from a random sample of vectors that had been z-
scored (zero mean and unit standard deviation). The 
kernel was recomputed for the same set of vectors over 
a range of σ values to determine the σ that yields 
the kernel distribution with the minimum variance, 
which therefore corresponds to a wider spread of 
similarities across the kernel space.  This wide spread 
distribution tends to yield good distinguishing ability 
and is used to identify the relative order of magnitude 
for σ . Cross validation is typically done in data 
mining to ensure the σ is optimal, however for this 
study, labeled examples of anomalous flights are not 
known beforehand and therefore cross validation was 
not an option. After performing this search 5-folds 
(where data is randomly subsampled for each 
iteration), a best σ was computed by taking the mean 
σ value across the 5-folds. This process was observed 
to be stable with tight bounds across the runs and has 
worked well in other best σ searches for other data 
mining applications.  
Once the best σ values are calculated the 
kernels for each trajectory (latitude, longitude, 
altitude, and distance to nearest aircraft) for similar 
runway destinations are computed from the z-score 
normalized training data. The novel aspect to MKAD 
is in its ability to combine the features in the kernel 
space. This is simply done by taking the weighted 
average of each kernel shown here in Eq. 2, where 𝑊𝑚 
represents the weights of the m-th kernel and 𝜅𝑚 is the 
m-th kernel function. For this study all kernels were 
given equal weights of 0.25.  
Combined Kernels: 
 𝜅(?⃗?𝑖 , ?⃗?𝑗) = ∑ 𝑊𝑚 ∗ 𝜅𝑚(?⃗?𝑖, ?⃗?𝑗)              
𝑛
𝑚=1
          (2)  
After the kernel is combined the 1-class SVM can be 
solved given the following optimization problem and 
constraints shown in Eqs. 3 and 4. 
Minimize:
𝑄 =
1
2
∑ 𝛼𝑖𝜅(?⃗?𝑖, ?⃗?𝑗)𝛼𝑗
𝜂
𝑖,𝑗
                                               (3) 
 
Subject to: 
 0 ≤ 𝛼𝑖 ≤
1
𝜂𝜐
, ∑ 𝛼𝑖 = 1,
𝑖
0 ≤ 𝜐 ≤ 1                        (4) 
Where 𝜂 is the number of trajectories in the training 
set and 𝜐 is provided by the user and corresponds to 
the maximum fraction of data assumed to be 
anomalous (in this study 𝜐 was 15%).  After solving 
for α, given the constraints, the non-zero α values are 
considered to be the support vectors and define the 
hyperplane used to separate the anomalous trajectories 
from the normal. To determine the distance the 
hyperplane lies from the origin, 𝜌  needs to be 
calculated (shown in Eq. 5). 
𝜌  =
1
𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ(𝛼)
∑ ∑ 𝛼𝑖𝜅(?⃗?𝑖 , ?⃗?𝑗)
𝑖∈𝛼>0𝑗∈𝛼>0
;                (5) 
               𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒: 𝜌 ≥ 0                                 
The anomalous examples are rank ordered by the 
algorithm based on their distance to the hyperplane. 
The anomalies are located on the negative side of the 
hyperplane, whereas the nominal examples are on the 
positive side. The severity of the anomaly is 
determined by its distance from the hyperplane. Only 
negative examples are marked as anomalous. The 
formula for calculating the rank order scores is shown 
in Eq. 6. 
𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒(𝑦𝑖) =   ∑ 𝛼𝑖𝜅(?⃗?𝑖, ?⃗?𝑗)
𝑖∈𝛼
−   𝜌                           (6) 
Once the models for each runway are learned on 
training data from a sliding window of previous N 
days, the models are applied to a test day to determine 
which flights are anomalous within that day. After the 
flights are identified the contributions from each 
kernel can be linearly computed and are used to 
determine the factors that contributed to the flight 
being labeled as anomalous (for example flights with 
high proximity to neighboring flights may have high 
contributions from the distance to nearest aircraft 
vector).  
Data Management Process and Prototype 
The surveillance data used in this study comes 
from four ATC facilities. The New York Terminal 
Radar Approach Control (N90) and the New York Air 
Route Traffic Control Center (ZNY) provide 
surveillance data for the New York area. The Denver 
Terminal Radar Approach Control (D01) and the 
Denver Air Route Traffic Control Center (ZDV) 
provide surveillance data for the Denver area. With the 
FAA approval, NASA was given access to PDARS 
data from the 2013 calendar year.  Approximately 
386,000 flights were analyzed to obtain the final 
results listed in the results section below. 
Figure 1 illustrates the data processing flow from 
data collection through merging, filtering and anomaly 
detection. Starting at the top center of the figure, raw 
ATC data collected from the ATC facilities are first 
processed to create flight trajectories. Some 
surveillance data from the FAA facilities contain data 
from multiple radar sensors. In this case, N90 and D01 
are both multiple radar systems, which contain data 
from 5 and 10 radar sensors respectively. The multiple 
sensors systems create additional complexity when 
producing high-quality flight trajectories for analysis 
as the coverage for those sensors can overlap. During 
the processing step, the PDARS system selects the best 
radar hits to use based on many different criteria in 
order to produce the best quality of four-dimensional 
(latitude, longitude, altitude, and time) trajectories for 
flights. The resultant data provides analysis ready 
trajectories between Air Route Traffic Control Center 
airspace boundary and the Terminal Radar Approach 
Control boundary. Since this study is focused on 
finding unusual patterns in commercial Instrument 
Flight Rules (IFR) aircraft, Visual Flight Rules (VFR) 
flights with beacon codes from 1200 to 1299 and 
military flights are removed from the data for analysis 
however, they are considered when calculating the 
distance to nearby aircraft. The additional benefit of 
removing those flights is that military and non-discrete 
code VFR flights typically will have unusual flights 
paths as compared to commercial flights, and by 
removing those flights the tool is expected to yield 
more relevant results during the data mining process.  
Also during the processing step, additional flight 
information such as destination airport and landing 
runway are computed at the same time.  
   
 
Figure 1 Data Processing Flow   
The flight trajectories are then used to calculate 
the minimum separation between flights. The delta 
vertical and lateral distance between track points for 
each pair of flights with the same timestamp are 
compared. A daily time-series report showing where 
each of the two flights is located during the time 
overlap is generated. This daily report is then filtered 
to remove all entries with vertical separation over 
2000 feet and lateral separation greater than 6 nautical 
miles. Subject matter experts selected these maximum 
values to retain operationally significant separation 
information to capture trajectories indicating how 
rapidly aircraft were converging under the upper 
bounds, while reducing the files to a 
manageable/searchable size. For each trajectory, from 
30 nautical miles (NM) out from the destination 
airport, the minimum separation is found and used to 
create four-dimensional trajectories: latitude, 
longitude, altitude and distance to nearest neighboring 
flight. If no separation values are within the 
thresholds, the threshold values are used. These four 
features are then averaged over half nautical mile 
intervals from 30 NM to the runway threshold based 
on distance traveled and are partitioned into sets of 
trajectories landing at each airport on each day. This 
results in having uniform trajectories with fixed vector 
lengths because of the half-mile binning and the fixed 
30 NM distance traveled. 
For every day and airport runway, the previous 
days are compared against each other to create a model 
of nominal behavior for each destination runway and 
used by the MKAD algorithm. Runway usage (due to 
hardware memory constraints) limits the number of 
preceding days that can be considered; for this study 
we used the following training sets: DEN (120 days), 
EWR (30 days), JFK (60 days), and LGA (50 days). 
The algorithm builds a training model based on the 
trajectories from the previous rolling window and tests 
on the day of interest to compute the anomalies.  The 
anomalies are reported to data analysts for 
examination. Trajectories of interest are investigated 
further utilizing the Graphical Airspace Design 
Environment (GRADE), a graphical analysis tool. The 
overall traffic flow is visualized with the tool to obtain 
a better understanding of the airspace and traffic flows 
for each situation. After some flights of interest have 
been identified by the analysts, the voice data, when 
available from LiveATC.net, is analyzed to find the 
relevant communications that pertain to the flights of 
interest. Transcripts of the recordings are done by hand 
and used to provide context for the most significant 
scenarios. This information is used to further 
understand the scenarios and the key characteristics 
are summarized with animations and presented to the 
subject matter experts familiar with the airspace.  
The refined algorithmic tool from this study is 
deployed as a prototype into a lab demonstration of the 
PDARS environment to demonstrate the feasibility of 
transferring this technology from a research 
environment into an operational environment by 
automatically generating a daily report of the 
algorithm output. The prototype daily anomaly 
reporting program follows a similar flow but has been 
automated to run when the trajectory file with the 
previous day’s flights is available on the staging 
server. Additionally flights windowed around the 
same time frame from the previous year that have 
already been processed are added to the training 
corpus along with the previous month’s flights to help 
build a more comprehensive model and to preserve 
seasonal effects in the training data. For the first case 
study the report prototype is customized to analyze 
flights landing at DEN. Once subject matter experts 
have evaluated the results using the criteria used in the 
results section of this paper, additional airports can 
easily be set up to be monitored.  
Results 
Approximately 90 flights were given to 
subject matter experts for further analysis after 
visually inspecting from the list of anomalies 
generated by the algorithmic tool. Out of these, 33 
were deemed to hold some operational significance. 
The remaining 57 were considered statistically 
significant anomalies but were not considered by the 
subject matter experts to pose a significant safety risk. 
The operationally significant flights were presented to 
local controllers and subject matter experts from D01 
and N90 familiar with the everyday operations at the 
respective facilities. For brevity, this section will cover 
11 representative scenarios of the 33. Each scenario 
discussed below provides a short description of the 
operational situation, offers the subject matter 
experts’/controllers’ feedback for the possible 
explanation(s) of what may have led up to the flight’s 
unusual behavior and provides a description of each 
scenario’s potential relevance to safety risk. The 
scenarios were reviewed by FAA Safety personnel and 
checked against TARP and CEDAR logs. The 
expectation was that if a TARP event indicated a loss 
of separation it would create an Electronic Occurrence 
Report (EOR). In order to reduce unnecessary or 
nuisance alerts, facilities have the ability to create 
rules that define exemptions near the airport for alert 
reporting. The TARP/CEDAR review board then 
makes a determination as to whether the exemption 
may be approved.  Flights that qualify for an 
exemption or are single events will not generate an 
EOR. The PDARS go-around reports were also 
checked to determine if a flight was caught by the 
current automatic reports.  
In the following descriptions the aircraft 
identified with the unusual trajectory is referred to as 
TGT AC (i.e., the “target aircraft”). Other flights in the 
airspace will be referred to as FLTXX. The Extended 
Runway Center (ERC) lines (where appropriate) are 
shown in a GRADE-based graphic that illustrates the 
scenario to give a sense of horizontal alignment with 
the runways for the aircraft’s turn to final. Pertinent 
information contained in aviation routine weather 
reports also known as METAR weather reports for the 
hour of an aircraft’s arrival at the destination airport 
are provided for scenarios when relevant.   
LGA Scenario 1 
Description: A Bombardier CRJ700 series 
(TGT AC) flight landing on runway 22 at LGA is 
given an extended right downwind leg for sequencing 
to follow an arrival on a straight-in approach to the 
same runway. TGT AC intercepts runway 22 ERC at 
10 NM from runway threshold and is 38 knots faster 
than the proceeding aircraft and in trail by 3 NM.  Over 
the next 2.5 minutes, TGT AC is able to decelerate to 
a speed closer to the preceding aircraft; however by 
this time in trail distance has decreased to 1.5 NM.   
LGA tower voice recordings reveal that TGT AC is 
issued a go-around by the LGA tower controller due to 
the overtake situation. Figure 2 shows the sequential 
closure of in-trail distance and speed differential 
between the TGT AC and FLT01 that indicate an 
impending overtake on a single runway operation. The 
situation was mitigated by the controller executing a 
go-around.   
Explanation: TGT AC is on a vector for an 
Instrument Landing System (ILS) approach and the 
traffic pattern is extended out to approximately 14 NM 
to allow merging of flights on straight-in to runway 22. 
TGT AC is considerably faster than FLT01 and the 
TGT AC may have kept its speed up to enable an 
earlier traffic merging and/or to avoid any additional 
delay. The voice recordings indicate that the LGA 
tower controller instructed the TGT AC to go-around 
with a clearance to maintain runway heading and 
climbing to 2,000 feet.  If wake-turbulence were an 
issue the LGA tower controller would most likely have 
initiated a go-around earlier. The tool flagged this 
anomaly due to the unusual proximity to the nearest 
aircraft as the top contributing factor at this point in 
the flight.   
             
 
Figure 2 Impending Overtake Scenario. 
Safety Review: Apparently the trailing 
aircraft was not able to reduce airspeed in time and/or 
fly the aircraft to maintain sufficient spacing (this 
could have been due to the aircraft not being 
configured yet). The controller resolved the situation 
by issuing a go-around and re-sequencing the TGT AC 
for another approach. CEDAR identified an EOR for 
the TGT AC. There was a manually written report 
associated with the TGT AC stating a turbo-jet go-
around within a 0.5 NM of the runway. PDARS also 
captured this flight in the daily LGA go-around report. 
LGA Scenario 2 
Description: An Embraer E-170 aircraft (TGT 
AC) descending from 12,000 feet on a vector for a 
landing on runway 22 at LGA stops descent at 5,000 
feet when approached from the opposite direction by a 
VFR flight Piper PA-28 Cherokee (FLT01) at 4,500 
feet and 1.5 NM southwest. TGT AC then 
immediately executes climb back to 5,500 feet to 
establish needed separation.  
Explanation:  The LGA Sector controller 
receives TGT AC descending en route to LGA. At the 
same time, a PA28 aircraft is approaching from the 
opposite direction over Long Island Sound and 
descending on a VFR assigned beacon code. TGT AC 
is observed descending to 5,000 feet and then climbing 
back to 5,500 feet. No voice recordings were available 
for this event and it is unclear if the LGA controller 
issued climb or if the aircraft received a Traffic 
Collision Avoidance System Resolution Advisory. 
Figure 3 illustrates the situation in which aircraft are 
separated by less than 1,000 feet and 3 NM while 
traversing in opposite directions within terminal 
airspace. This situation is corrected when TGT AC 
climbs back to higher altitude thus re-establishing 
needed separation criteria. The tool flagged this 
anomaly due to the unusual proximity of TGT AC to a 
nearby aircraft as the top contributing factor at this 
point in the flight. 
  
  
Figure 3 Loss of Separation Scenario. 
Safety Review: The airspace stratification is very 
complex in the area where the aircraft are 
transitioning, with aircraft being worked by multiple 
controllers. Our developed data mining tool could be 
useful in identifying high-risk IFR/VFR crossing 
“hotspots”. A request was made to the CEDAR logs, 
but an EOR was unavailable for this event. 
JFK Scenario 3 
Description: A Boeing 777-200 (TGT AC), 
an overseas arrival to JFK, executes an approach for 
landing runway 31R.  The TGT AC is at a very high 
ground speed and high angle of intercept as the aircraft 
approaches the 31R ERC outside the Outer Marker 
(OM). At the time of approach, the winds were from 
the north at 16 gusting to 22 knots, which could have 
contributed to the aircraft’s excessive ground speed. 
This high-energy approach results in the TGT AC 
overshooting the final approach course by more than 
5,000 feet and when an attempt to make a visual 
approach to runway 31R is unsatisfactory, the pilot 
initiates a go-around. 
Explanation:  The aircraft may not have been 
configured to land and makes the decision to go-
around.  It is also feasible that the TGT AC may have 
lined up incorrectly for the wrong runway (i.e., 31L).  
Available voice recordings only indicate pilot stating 
“going around” at the time of the maneuver.  The 
aircraft’s late turn to intercept ILS 31R with ground 
speed at 252 knots is 70 knots greater than the other 
aircraft observed executing the same approach 
procedure during this time period. On the second 
approach the aircraft is told by the controller to expect 
ILS 31R and the controller queried if the pilot had 
airport in sight. The pilot requests ILS 31R and 
conducts a late turn and overshoots ERC again before 
landing.  Figure 4 shows the aircraft intercepting the 
final approach course at too high of a ground speed 
and at an excessive angle of intercept.  The outcome is 
an overshoot of the ERC and the inability to maneuver 
the aircraft for a safe landing results in a pilot initiated 
go-around. The tool flagged this anomaly due to the 
unusual altitude profile as well as contributions from 
the latitude shift as the top contributing factors.  
   
 
Figure 4 High Speed and Angle of Intercept 
Scenario. 
Safety Review: Desirable angle of intercept 
and speed of intercept of the ERC are 30 degrees or 
less and 180 knots or less, respectively. Unfamiliarity 
with airport, existing wind conditions, pilot technique, 
long haul fatigue, and/or failure to configure aircraft 
for landing in time may have been factor(s) in this 
occurrence. This flight was captured in the daily 
PDARS JFK go-around report.  
JFK Scenario 4 
Description: An Airbus A320 (TGT AC) 
overshoots the ERC at JFK during a midnight 
operation for landing runway 04L.  The final approach 
is initiated 10 NM from the runway threshold at an 
excessive intercept angle, ground speed, and altitude 
as compared to other flights observed landing that day. 
Vertical separation is maintained from an adjacent 
heavy aircraft already established on ILS 04R.  A 
controller voice recording indicates TGT AC is 
instructed to maintain 2,500 feet until established on 
centerline of 04L before descending to complete visual 
approach. 
 
Figure 5 Visual Approach with ERC Overshoot 
Scenario. 
Explanation:  TGT AC is on a vector for a visual 
approach2 to runway 04L at the same time as a heavy 
arrival (FLT155) is executing an ILS 04R approach on 
adjacent parallel runway.  The ground speed (234 
knots), altitude (3,800 feet) and angle of intercept 
(greater than 100 degrees) are all contributors to the 
overshoot of the target ERC.  The voice recording 
indicates that the controller apprised TGT AC of the 
FLT155 and that the TGT AC confirmed visual 
contact. The JFK controller separated aircraft 
vertically, but may have delayed turn for operational 
concerns thus issuing clearance to intercept localizer 
too late.  Figure 5 illustrates excessive ground speed, 
altitude, and angle of intercept by a late night JFK 
arrival conducting a visual approach.  The result was 
an overshoot of the desired ERC with vertical 
separation maintained from aircraft on the adjacent 
parallel runway.  The tool flagged this anomaly due to 
                                                     
2Section 5-4-23 Visual Approach. (n.d.). In the Federal Aviation 
Administration’s Aeronautical Information Manual (July 24, 
the proximity of TGT AC to a nearby aircraft and the 
unusual southern latitude shift as the top contributing 
factors at this point in the flight. 
Safety Review: The TGT AC was cleared for a 
visual approach to runway 04L. Excessive ground 
speed, altitude, and angle of intercept all contributed 
to the overshoot as well as potential late controller 
action. Late night operations could have affected the 
pilot’s performance in attempting a visual approach to 
the landing runway. A CEDAR log request was made, 
but an EOR was unavailable for this event. 
JFK Scenario 5 
Description: In this scenario, a routine daily 
short-haul cargo flight, a Beechcraft 1900 twin-
turboprop (B190) from Canada to JFK that normally 
arrives between 11:00 PM and 01:00 AM is examined.  
The initial flight plan for the daily B190 flight is a 
routing to a fix 60 NM north of JFK for sequencing to 
primary arrival runway 22L at JFK. Generally when 
operational circumstances allow, the original flight 
plan is either amended or cancelled and a direct 
routing for VOR or visual approach to 13L is 
requested to shorten flight time and expedite taxi time 
to the cargo terminal (located at the north end of JFK).  
Upon approaching JFK for landing 13L, airport 
conditions may not allow an immediate landing on 
desired runway and various flight maneuvers (see 
Figure 6) are used to redirect the aircraft’s approach to 
another runway that still provides a landing roll-out as 
near to cargo terminal as feasible.  Weather could have 
been a factor for the flight that was re-sequenced from 
13L to 22L, which required a close in 270 degree turn. 
Weather in this instance was 4 SM visibility and light 
rain as reported in the METAR data. 
Explanation: In addition to switching to 
various runways, flights can be required to make 360 
turns and S-turns to accomplish the landing setup to 
amended runway assignments.  These arrivals utilize 
close-in rapid descents from high altitudes when 
approaching JFK for 13L and characteristically remain 
for the most part above standard runway glide slope. 
As a cargo flight, passenger comfort is not a concern 
and may be a factor in allowing these types of 
approaches. The tool flagged this anomaly due to the 
2014). Retrieved from      
http://www.faa.gov/air_traffic/publications/ATpubs/AIM/aim050
4.html#57  
unusual sharp drop in altitude as the top contributing 
factor in all of these flights.  
 
Figure 6  Unusual Approaches for Same Cargo 
Flight Over 7 Different Days. 
Safety Review: These flights do not approach the 
airport via the conventional approach used by the 
majority of arrivals and in addition to making a close-
in high-energy descent, a wide spectrum of maneuvers 
are utilized to re-route the aircraft to other runways. 
These maneuvers include: path stretching, 360 turns, 
and S-turns all conducted at low altitude and late at 
night. Since this routing does not appear to be normal 
or standard operating procedures (SOP), not all 
controllers may be aware of how best to handle this 
nightly arrival. Using the data mining tool to identify 
unusual behavior could help facilities modify their 
SOPs so all controllers have an approved, coordinated, 
and documented procedure to handle these frequent 
unusual routings. 
EWR Scenario 6  
Description: A Beechcraft Super King Air 
200 (TGT AC) following an Embraer ERJ 145 
(FLT899) for landing on runway 22L at EWR. Voice 
recordings indicate that the pilot was unable to 
ascertain that a larger landing aircraft is in sight 
although the in-trail distance from the landing flight is 
3.6 NM. There is a 20-knot tail wind during the 
approach and METAR reports that overcast conditions 
exist which could contribute to pilots’ inability to see 
the preceding aircraft.  The EWR controller issues the 
TGT AC a go-around to avoid a potential wake 
turbulence situation under the existing approach 
circumstances.  The TGT AC executes go-around and 
is re-sequenced for subsequent landing on same 
runway. Figure 7 shows an aircraft making a go-
around initiated by the EWR controller as TGT AC 
reported landing aircraft not in sight.  
 
Figure 7 EWR Controller Initiated Go-Around 
Due to Lack of Visual Contact Scenario.  
Explanation: Approach turn-on angle and 
altitude at ERC intercept are both consistent with other 
approaches that day, but an overtake situation is 
progressing as the TGT AC is 20 knots faster than 
FLT899. TGT AC (a small wake vortex category of 
aircraft), following FLT899 (a large wake vortex 
category aircraft) is unable to maintain the required 
wake turbulence criteria as well as not having FLT899 
in-sight.  The EWR tower controller most likely 
initiates the go-around due to wake turbulence 
considerations and because the TGT AC is unable to 
visually identify FLT899 on final. The tool flagged 
this anomaly due to the unusual longitude trajectory 
during the go-around.  
Safety Review: The trailing aircraft is not 
able to establish visual contact on the landing aircraft 
and the wake turbulence considerations become an 
issue.  The controller resolves the situation by issuing 
a go-around and re-sequencing the TGT AC for 
landing. This aircraft was not included in the PDARS 
daily go-around report at EWR because the report 
filters out most general aviation aircraft.  
EWR Scenario 7 
Description: This fix is normally used to 
transition the aircraft for a right downwind approach 
to EWR runway 22L.  In this case, TGT AC is S-
turned to establish a left downwind for EWR runway 
22L.  This maneuver required the TGT AC to tunnel 
under EWR departure just departing from 22R as well 
as requiring FLT1623 to stop its left turn until 
sufficiently clear of the TGT AC. Figure 8 shows the 
re-routing of an EWR arrival that normally would 
utilize a right downwind for landing.  In this case, the 
flight is rerouted to the east side of EWR for landing, 
front-loading a heavy arrival rush by delaying inbound 
flights from the north and west. 
 
Figure 8 Unusual Re-Routing Arrival Event.  
Explanation:  The TGT AC is a San Juan 
departure filed over a waypoint 80 NM southeast of 
EWR. Other San Juan departures that day on a similar 
routing were also turned early but the majority 
assigned a right downwind for Runway 22L. Just after 
the TGT AC landed a heavy approach stream from the 
north was experienced followed by a heavier arrival 
rush from the west where flights were both path 
stretched to the north or issued holding prior to release 
for landing. There were no voice recordings available 
for this event. The tool flagged the unusual latitude 
trajectory as the top contributing factor. 
Safety Review: The left downwind to EWR 22L 
was used to possibly expedite and ease the sequencing 
for 22L prior to the heavy arrival rush forthcoming 
from north and west directions. The left downwind 
maneuver required crossing under EWR departure and 
to operate in the vicinity of two arrival flights inbound 
for landing at both EWR and TEB. This maneuver 
requires a rapid descent and abrupt turn in order to 
descend the aircraft below the altitude of the 22R 
departures. The potential for a conflict with a 
departure is increased.  
EWR Scenario 8  
 
 
Figure 9 Go-Around with ERC Overshoot 
Scenario. 
Description:  An Embraer E145 (TGT AC) 
arriving from a westerly direction experiences a slight 
overshoot (300 feet) after crossing EWR 22L ERC 
before being successfully established on the 22L 
localizer.  The TGT AC’s approach to the ERC (3 NM 
outside the OM) is at an altitude (2,900 feet), an 
intercept angle (40 degrees) and a ground speed (257 
knots) consistent with other observed flights on the 
same flight trajectory that day.  These other flights 
were able to execute a landing at EWR, whereas the 
TGT AC initiated a go-around upon reaching the 
threshold.  The final approach for the TGT AC exhibits 
flight characteristics very similar to other flights 
landing at EWR that day. Figure 9 shows a go-around 
of the TGT AC after approaching the runway 
threshold at an altitude and ground speed consistent 
with previous EWR arrivals.  
Explanation: The distance to the preceding 
aircraft FLT169 is 8 NM, so wake-turbulence would 
not be a problem.  The tower voice recordings reveal 
that the pilot initiated the go-around. Upon the second 
approach the tower controller asks if wind shear was 
the cause; however the pilot responds by stating that 
the aircraft was “just too high”. The tool flagged this 
anomaly due to the unusual latitude trajectory as the 
top contributing factor during the go-around. 
Safety Review: A go-around was executed 
successfully at the runway threshold and on the second 
approach the aircraft experienced an overshoot of 1.1 
NM due to an excessive ERC intercept angle. 
Subsequently the TGT AC was not established on the 
localizer until 1.5 NM inside of the OM.   Aircraft 
altitude at the runway threshold and ground speed 
were nearly identical to the first approach. This flight 
was captured in the daily PDARS go-around report for 
EWR. 
EWR Scenario 9 
Description: A Boeing 737 (TGT AC) conducts 
a visual approach to Runway 11 at EWR during 
afternoon converging runway operations and “ties” 
with an A320 (FLT1507) approaching Runway 22L 
from the north. The tower controller advises the TGT 
AC to execute a go-around due to conflict with arrival 
of FLT1507 on 22L.  The TGT AC is re-sequenced 
with later EWR arrivals inbound to 22L.  
Explanation:  The TGT AC may have been 
vectored and issued a late turn to final resulting in a tie 
with FLT1507. Although a passive visualization tool 
Converging Runway Display Aid (CRDA), which can 
be used to assist tower controllers in the spacing 
between Runway 11/22L converging approaches, was 
in use (according to the tower logs), it may not have 
been utilized properly making the coordination and 
timing of the two approaches more difficult. Voice 
recordings revealed that the EWR tower controller 
advised the TGT AC of conflict with FLT507 and sent 
the TGT AC around. Figure 10 shows a go-around of 
the TGT AC after criteria for continuation of 
converging approaches to Runways 11/22L at EWR 
were not met and the tower controller subsequently 
had TGT AC execute a go-around. The tool flagged 
this anomaly due to the unusual latitude trajectory as 
the top contributing factor during the go-around. 
Safety Review: Use of converging approaches 
requires that adequate spacing be available between 
the two aircraft executing the simultaneous 
approaches.  In this case, the tower controller 
determined the necessary criteria were not being met 
for this EWR operation and directs the go-around for 
a re-sequencing of the TGT AC.  This incident was not 
an isolated event while the CRDA was in use; another 
flight on a different day was re-sequenced to the 
crossing runway due to a similar potential “tie” 
situation. There was no indication in the tower logs 
that either of these aircraft had insufficient spacing or 
was issued a go-around, however, this flight was 
captured in the daily PDARS go-around report for 
EWR. This data mining tool could be used to passively 
identify instances of inadequate spacing for post 
CRDA/Converging Runway Operations (CRO) 
analysis.   
 
Figure 10 Converging Approach Go-Around 
Scenario.  
DEN Scenario 10  
Description:  An Airbus A319 (TGT AC) on 
approach to DEN intercepts ERC for Runway 26 just 
inside the OM.  FLT709 is on final to the same runway 
(3 NM ahead of TGT AC), but at a ground speed of 42 
knots less than the TGT AC. The TGT AC continues 
through ERC and momentarily parallels the localizer 
before making a sharp left turn in the direction of 
runway 25 at the OM (not shown).  TGT AC proceeds 
to cross Runway 25 ERC and executes a visual 
approach to runway 35R as FLT899 is at the same time 
on final to 35L.  
Explanation: Typically the switch to Runway 
35R could not be performed if a normal volume of 
traffic were present on 35R.  The TGT AC seemed to 
be on a VFR pattern, which is also unusual for a busy 
airport such as DEN.  Upon completing the turn 
inbound to Runway 35R, the TGT AC is 1.5 NM from 
FLT889 and 300 feet below. Figure 11 shows an 
aircraft making a runway change that is not a normal 
procedure at DEN. The tool flagged this anomaly due 
to contributions from the unusual change in longitude 
and latitude. 
 
Figure 11 Abnormal Cross Runway Change 
Scenario. 
Safety Review:  The TGT AC ground speed at 
OM for Runway 26 was excessive and most likely 
would have led to an eventual overtake of preceding 
flight, ultimately resulting in go-around if runway 
switch was not made. The intercept angle for Runway 
25 ERC at OM was 90 degrees making successful 
approach to runway 25 questionable.  Visual approach 
to 35R was described as an “aggressive turn” by the 
tower controllers that reviewed this event. The event 
was close-in to a runway, at a high ground speed (172 
knots) and a “belly-up” situation for TGT AC to 
FLT899 on the adjacent parallel approach.  
DEN Scenario 11  
Description: Figure 12 depicts a CR17 (TGT 
AC) intercepting the 17R ERC and a B190 (FLT01) 
intercepting the 17L ERC during period of triple 
approaches utilizing 16L, 17R, and 17L at DEN.  At 
the specific time shown in Figure 12, the TGT AC has 
overshot the 17R ERC and does not have adequate 
separation from FLT01 by 700 feet laterally and 100 
feet vertically.  
 
 
Figure 12 ERC Overshoot During Intercept of 
Parallel Runway Scenario.  
Explanation:  Five minutes prior to the 
overshoot event, the aircraft were separated by 7 miles 
and 1,000 feet.  The TGT AC continued descending 
and approached the assigned ERC at 25 knots higher 
ground speed than FLT01.  No voice recordings were 
available for this event. The tool flagged this anomaly 
due to its proximity to the nearest flight as well as 
contributions from the unusual shift in longitude. 
Safety Review: Use of simultaneous parallel 
approaches requires that adequate spacing be 
maintained between the aircraft executing these 
approaches.  In this case, the lateral and vertical 
distances were less than required.   The pilot may have 
switched from RNAV path to approach mode (FMS) 
and then corrected localizer line up.  The localizer 
signal strength would not have been an issue, since the 
usable distance on localizer at DEN is 30 NM and 
intercept was at 20 NM. 
Contributing Factors 
Figure 13 is a summary table that provides flight 
summary and characteristic categories for the 11 
scenarios discussed above. For scenarios 1, 3, 6, 8 and 
9 (the most common of the characteristic categories 
observed in the radar data), aircraft executed a go-
around during their initial approach attempt. Similarly, 
in four scenarios (1, 4, 10, and 11) each of the flights 
exhibited characteristics of excessive ground speeds 
during ERC intercept or on final approach. Six 
scenarios experienced at least one occurrence of S-
turns, too high on approach, and/or controller 
instructions being issued. Examples of other flight 
characteristics investigated by the subject matter 
experts as potential reasons for the flight anomalies 
that were identified by the algorithm and were 
observed more than once include: runway switching, 
excessive intercept angle, overshoot of the ERC, 
overtaking preceding aircraft, ground traffic 
interference, and separation issues. It is important to 
note that the algorithm can only identify contributing 
factors based on the features that it is given. For this 
study the algorithm is only analyzing high level 
trajectories. Additional features that can help 
distinguish finer grain safety risks such as those listed 
in Figure 13 could be included in future work to help 
automate the safety risk analysis.  
 
 
Figure 13 Safety Risk Summary Table for all 11 Flights. 
Conclusions 
This method has been demonstrated to be a valid 
and useful tool for identifying operationally 
significant safety events in approach trajectories 
landing at 4 major U.S. airports. The tool was able to 
discover events exhibiting flight characteristics 
indicative of safety-related concerns as well as 
incidents of unusual operational anomalies. The 
unusual operational anomalies identified included 
high energy approaches (speed and or altitude greater 
than normal for turn to final), unusual arrival routings, 
and unsuccessful CRDA spacing sequence of aircraft 
to intersecting runways. With the advancement of the 
daily reporting tool, in the demonstration PDARS 
environment, the method has been shown to provide 
an insightful glimpse into previously unmonitored 
potential safety risks in the NAS and has taken 
significant steps in becoming a tool that can be used to 
make informed decisions regarding safety risks 
automatically. The FAA has expressed interest in 
further testing and advancement of this tool on an FAA 
system at an additional TRACON facility. By utilizing 
this tool the FAA can help pre-identify safety risk 
trends to proactively mitigate these risks and help 
prevent future incidents or accidents. This tool 
addresses an aspect of safety monitoring that is not 
currently being leveraged and can help complement 
the current state-of-the-art by providing a more 
holistic approach to safety in an already tightly 
monitored system such as the NAS.  
Future Work 
With the implementation of the algorithm as a 
prototype daily reporting tool the anomalies identified 
every day will need to be validated to determine 
whether the algorithm is performing properly. In the 
future the flights identified by the algorithm should be 
evaluated by subject matter experts to determine their 
safety significance. Based on this feedback, changes to 
the algorithm may be needed. This might include 
finding a better kernel function or developing a way to 
distinguish operationally significant anomalies 
between purely statistically significant trajectories that 
pose no safety risks. NASA is currently looking into 
active learning methods that aid in improving the 
classification between these types of anomalies, which 
can re-rank the anomalies so the flights of interest are 
more interesting to safety analysts and relevant to 
critical safety risks in the airspace. Ultimately, 
successful identification of new areas of NAS safety 
risk from this approach can be integrated into future 
risk-based safety decision making methods being 
pursued by ANSPs including the FAA[11]. 
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